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The concentration of high frequency controls in a limited period of time (“crackdowns”) constitutes an 
important feature of many law-enforcement policies around the world. In this paper, we offer a 
comprehensive investigation on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown policies 
using a lab-in-the-field experiment with real passengers of a public transport service. We introduce a 
novel game, the daily public transportation game, where subjects have to decide, over many periods, 
whether to buy or not a ticket knowing that there might be a control. Our results show that (a) 
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1. Introduction 
A crackdown – i.e. the concentration of high-frequency or systematic controls in a 
limited amount of time and/or on a delimited geographical area or subset of the 
population – is a type of policy intervention widely used by law-enforcement 
institutions to fight against crime (Sherman, 1990; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2002, 
2004; Kleiman, 2009; Eeckhout et al., 2010; van der Weele, 2012). It was one of the 
most important policing policies in the U.S (Sherman, 1990) as well as in China in the 
1980s (Schultz, 1989), and has still great relevance worldwide. Its applications 
include tax audits (Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011), traffic enforcement 
(Eeckhout et al., 2010), corruption and theft (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003, 2004), 
drug markets (Farrell and Thorne, 2005), and urban violence (Moeller, 2009). It is 
also frequently used in public transportations to discourage fare-dodging. 
  Several economic theories have modeled the advantages of employing 
crackdown policies (Lando and Shavell, 2004; Lazear, 2006; Eeckhout et al., 2010). 
These studies show that if the relationship between crime and expected punishment is 
concave, crackdowns will outperform a randomly distributed control strategy; if it is 
convex, then the opposite will hold. These models also demonstrate that crackdowns 
should be pre-announced in order to maximize their deterrent effect, especially to 
modify the behavior of those who have the highest cost of effort. From an empirical 
perspective, it is however hard to measure the shape of the relationship between crime 
and expected punishment using field data. In addition, the evaluation of 
pre-announced crackdowns is usually based on their immediate effects while they 
may also have effects in the long run. These long-term effects may be deleterious if 
more crimes are induced as soon as a crackdown ends; they may be positive if a high 
risk of control has an educative effect. 
 Empirical studies, such as Kastlunger et al. (2009), Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2003, 2004), Dai et al. (2015c), Banuri and Eckel (2015) offer mixed evidence on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of crackdowns. Moreover, they do not investigate the 
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relative efficiency and effectiveness of crackdowns to alternative mechanisms of 
crime prevention such as non-concentrated random controls keeping everything else 
constant.1 Without a suitable comparison test, it is difficult to discern the real 
capacity of crackdown policies from these studies.  
  To fill this gap, we conducted an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and 
List 2004) using passengers of the public transport service in Lyon, the third largest 
city in France. We look at small-scale cheating of ordinary people which, quite 
contrary to what one would expect, has the largest social and economic impact for 
society (Bucciol et al., 2013; Mazar and Ariely, 2006). More precisely, we investigate 
fare evasion.2 According to some recent statistics, fare-dodging caused € 300 million 
loss to the French national railway company and € 100 million to the Parisian public 
transport operator in 2013 (Lefigaro.fr, 2013). It is not a problem circumscribed to 
France but it is widespread in all countries (Bonfanti and Wagenknecht, 2010). It is 
thus important to determine which and to what extent crackdown policies are effective 
and efficient to fight against fare evasion. 
To investigate the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown 
policies we propose a novel game called the daily public transportation game. In this 
laboratory game, participants have to decide repeatedly (i.e. over many periods) 
whether to buy or not a (experimental) bus ticket knowing that there is a risk of 
control. We study how compliance behavior evolves over time depending on subjects’ 
exposure to either repeated controls concentrated in a given period of time 
(crackdown) or irregular controls spread out over time. We analyze behavior during 
and after periods of control to investigate the immediate/short-term and long-term 
effects of these policies. We also test whether it is more effective to introduce !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1! These studies either did not explicitly compare the efficiency and effectiveness of a crackdown 
policy to an alternative mechanism of crime prevention such as random controls (Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2003, 2004; Banuri and Eckel, 2015) or they vary at the same time other things than just 
the concentration of controls (Dai et al., 2015c; Kastlunger et al., 2009). For instance, Dai et al. (2015c) 
also vary the total number of audits, while Kastlunger et al. (2009) indirectly change subjects’ 
expectation of an audit by informing them in advance of the overall probability of being audit.!
2 The cost of using a public vehicle is, in general, quite small (the price of a ticket is € 1.70 in the city 
where this study was conducted). It thus seems appropriate to classify fare dodging as a case of 
small-scale cheating.   
 4 
crackdowns at an early or later stage of the game, and whether crackdowns should be 
pre-announced ex ante or not (i.e. whether or not subjects should be informed in 
advance of a control).  
With respect to the latter comparison, our experiment also contributes to the 
literature on the efficiency of sanction mechanisms under ambiguity.3 Indeed, when 
crackdowns are not pre-announced, subjects do not know whether there will be a 
control or not and what is the probability of its occurrence (i.e. condition of 
uncertainty). We therefore contribute to the study of the effects of ambiguity on 
behavior in the loss domain, whereas the impact of ambiguity is much more 
frequently studied in the gain domain. In contrast, when crackdowns are announced in 
advance, subjects are fully informed about whether a control will occur (i.e. condition 
of certainty). By comparing these alternative conditions, we can investigate whether 
uncertainty favors compliance or not.  
An additional originality of our study is that we ran our experiment with a 
non-standard subject pool consisting of passengers of the public transport. This 
enables us to test different crackdown policies with a representative sample of the 
people for which these policies can be directly relevant.4 In addition, we are able to 
identify real fare-dodgers by verifying whether subjects can present a validated ticket 
at the end of the experiment and by asking subjects to self-report how often they 
travel without a valid ticket in their real life. This allows us to compare the behavior 
of actual fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers in our game, and to test whether our 
game captures important dimensions of actual behavior in the field. Hence, our study 
also contributes to the general discussion about whether experimental results can be 
generalized to the real world (for a recent overview on this topic, see Fréchette and 
Schotter, 2015). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See, for example, Dai et al. (2015c) for a discussion on related studies.!
4 To strengthen the link of our experiment with the real world, we also frame the experimental setting 
in terms of the natural environment where these subjects take decisions about public transportation. 
This also facilitated the comprehension of the instructions for participants who possessed very different 
socio-economic and educational backgrounds.   
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To give a very brief preview of our findings, in the presence of ambiguity on 
audits (and thus on sanctions), random controls which are spread out over time are 
more effective at reducing fare-dodging in the laboratory than crackdowns, and this 
effect is even stronger for real-world fare-dodgers. We also find that a more prolonged 
crackdown reduces fare-dodging during the period of intense monitoring but induces 
a burst of fraud as soon as it ends. Furthermore, pre-announced controls induce more 
fraud in the periods without control. Compared to non-concentrated random controls, 
crackdowns have a positive impact on compliance but only in the short run. However, 
they entail potentially deleterious effects in the long run since, after a crackdown is 
over, fraud rate increases to levels that are even higher than before the introduction of 
the crackdown even when crackdowns are not pre-announced and individuals do not 
know the total number of audits. Finally, we find that real fare-dodgers cheat more in 
all treatments compared to non-fare-dodgers.  
  In the remainder of our paper, Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the experimental 
findings while Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
2. Related studies 
Theoretical studies have shown the advantages of crackdowns (Lando and Shavell, 
2004; Lazear, 2006; Kleiman and Kilmer, 2009; Eeckout et al., 2010). These papers 
mainly focus on when crackdowns are optimal to use. The models by Lazear (2006) 
and Eeckhout et al. (2010) are more germane to our experimental setting as they focus 
on systematic controls in a limited amount of time or delimited geographical area.5 
Their results rely on the shape of the relationship between crime and expected 
punishment. In particular, concentrating the enforcement resources in a specific area 
or period of time is predicted to generate a greater reduction in crime than spreading 
the same resources over a broader area or longer period of time but only when the 
relationship between crime and expected punishment is concave. When the opposite is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Lando and Shavell (2004) and Kleiman and Kilmer (2009) are more interested on the implications of 
concentrating sanctions on a subset of violators rather than a period of time or geographical area. 
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true (i.e. the relationship is not concave), a less concentrated control policy is more 
effective. It is however difficult to test these models empirically since the shape of the 
relationship between crime and expected punishment cannot be easily identified in 
real settings. Our results can indirectly shed light on this relationship: if crackdowns 
are more efficient than less concentrated controls, we may infer that the relationship 
between crime and expected punishment is concave.  
  Some empirical studies have investigated the efficiency of crackdown policies. 
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) showed that the prices paid by hospitals for basic 
and homogenous inputs decreased by 15% during the first 9 months of a crackdown. 
In a natural experiment, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) found a large deterrent 
effect on car thefts once police protection had increased after a terroristic attack. In 
these two studies, the measure of efficiency is however imprecise for several reasons. 
First, the total enforcement input is unknown. Second, there may be other changes 
during the crackdown period that may affect behavior. For example, in Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2003) the evolution of wages may also play a role in limiting 
corruption, and, therefore, the pure effect of the crackdown cannot be totally isolated 
(Banuri and Eckel, 2015).  
  We are only aware of three experimental studies explicitly related to 
crackdowns. They show that crackdowns impact, if anything, only in the short run, 
and have no effect or even a deleterious one in the long run. The first study by 
Kastlunger et al. (2009) examines the impact of various sequences of audits on tax 
compliance when subjects know the probability of audits but not their distribution 
over time. They show that! the decrease of compliance after an audit is caused more by 
misperception of chance than by the willingness to repair a loss. In contrast, Dai et al. 
(2015c) investigate compliance under ambiguity when subjects ignore not only the 
distribution of audits over time but also the overall probability of audits. Their vehicle 
of research is a public good game with a centralized mechanism of punishment that 
sanctions, with a certain probability, subjects who contributed less than the average 
group contribution. The results indicate that even under ambiguity, the contribution 
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level is the same under a continuous audit regime (in which the –unknown- 
probability of being punished is equal to 1) compared to a random audit regime (in 
which the probability of being punished is equal to 1/3 but with a fine coefficient 
three times higher). Interestingly, the results also show that contributions were 
significantly lower in the former than in the latter regime after audits were completely 
removed. This suggests that when individuals are not informed on the risk of being 
audited, crackdowns may be less efficient than more irregular audits because subjects 
are less able to update their beliefs when audits are more irregular.  
The third experimental study is Banuri and Eckel (2015). The authors use a 
bribery laboratory experiment to investigate whether a crackdown has long-term 
effects on compliance. Crackdowns were introduced in the second of three ten-period 
blocks. By comparing the corruption levels in the pre-crackdown block with the 
post-crackdown block, the authors found no significant difference. They therefore 
conclude that short-term crackdowns are largely ineffective in changing behavior in 
the long run.  
Compared to the previous studies, the current study allows us not only to 
compare the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown policies but 
also to study the impact of reintroducing a crackdown, the length and the timing of a 
crackdown, and the consequence of combing crackdowns with random controls. In 
addition, it enables us to investigate the role of pre-announcement in both crackdown 
and random-control policies. On this respect, theoretical papers suggest that 
crackdowns should be pre-announced to deter illegal behaviors (Lazear, 2006; 
Kleiman and Kilmer, 2009; Eeckout et al., 2010). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no systematic study that investigates the short-run and long-run 
implications of pre-announcing or not a crackdown.6 Finally, our study enables us to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 We acknowledge that there are a few studies in the literature on tax evasion that investigate the effect 
of sending threat-of-audit letters (e.g. Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Fiorio and Santoro, 
2013). What is usually found is that informing people about the audit activity has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on tax fraud compliance. More relevant for us is the study of Alm et al. 
(2009) who investigated, by means of a lab experiment, different ways in which information regarding 
the audit activity can be transmitted ex-ante and ex-post to the taxpayers. They ran sessions where the 
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measure the impact of different law-enforcement policies using real-world subjects 
for whom these policies may be directly relevant in their everyday life.  
3. Experimental design and procedures 
3.1 Experimental design 
The experiment is divided in five different parts. In the first part, we elicited 
participant’s attitudes towards risk and ambiguity both in the domain of gains and in 
the domain of losses. In the second part, we measured subjects’ tendency to behave 
dishonestly by asking them to privately roll a dice and report the outcome (a task 
similar to the one used in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In the third part, we 
measured the tendency to behave dishonesty in a contextualized laboratory task which 
was described as a decision on whether to buy or not a ticket for using public 
transportation and covering different trip lengths.7 The fourth part was what we refer 
to as the daily public transportation game which is the main focus of this paper and is 
described in detail below. The final part was a socio-demographic questionnaire 
which was administered to the subjects at the end of the experiment. A detailed 
description of the second and third parts, together with their main results, are reported 
in a companion paper (Dai et al., 2015b). No feedback or information about future 
tasks was given to subjects in parts 1-3. In addition, all subjects went through the 
same parts (in the same order), and, therefore, earlier tasks could not explain 
across-treatment differences in the daily public transportation game.        
Elicitation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. We elicited the participants’ 
risk attitudes using a task developed by Eckel and Grossman (2008) and adopting a 
similar visual representation as Eckel et al. (2012) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2013). 
Subjects made four consecutive lottery choices, first in the gain domain, then in the 
loss domain, next in the gain domain under ambiguity, and finally in the loss domain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
audit probability was pre-announced and sessions where it was not, and found that compliance was on 
average lower in the former. However, differently from our experiment, they did not consider periods 
of intense control (i.e. crackdowns). 
7 We asked subjects to make several decisions under different audit probabilities and fines. 
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under ambiguity. Every time the choice was displayed in a new screen.8 Each choice 
consisted in selecting the most preferred of six possible lotteries. Table 1 displays the 
six lotteries for both the choices in the gain and loss domain. When the risk was 
known by the subjects, each lottery involved a 50/50 chance of a low or a high payoff. 
Moving from Lottery 1 to Lottery 6, both expected return and risk (standard deviation) 
increase. Hence, subjects who are extremely risk-averse should choose the sure 
Lottery 1. Moderately risk-averse individuals should choose an intermediate lottery 
(Lotteries 2-4). Risk-neutral subjects should choose Lottery 5 or 6. Risk-seeking 
persons should choose Lottery 6. In the loss domain, lotteries could give negative 
payoffs. To prevent participants to make real losses in the experiment, we assigned 
subjects an initial endowment of € 40. This makes the expected payoffs equivalent in 
the loss and in the gain domains. Hence, the losses were only a framing manipulation. 
Under ambiguity, the payoffs were the same as in the choices under certainty but the 
probability of each outcome was uncertain (between 3/10 and 7/10). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The daily public transportation game. Each participant was initially endowed 
with € 35 to avoid a net loss in this game. To facilitate subjects’ understanding of the 
experimental environment and enhance the external validity of our experimental 
setting in relation to the real-world environment where our subjects usually operated, 
we described the laboratory game as a choice on whether to pay or not a ticket for 
using a bus.9 The game consists of 60 periods (“days”) in total divided in 2 blocks of 
30 days. For each day, participants were asked to decide whether or not buy a ticket to 
use a bus. The cost of a ticket was €1.70.10 Subjects were told that a control of the 
ticket could occur in certain days. Subjects received no information on the number of 
audits and their distribution over time. If a participant was caught travelling without a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The order in which subjects made their choices was kept fixed to facilitate decision-making and 
avoid confusion. 
9 We however refrain from using strong terminology which could lead to experimenter demand effects. 
10 This was also equivalent to the real cost of using a public transport in the French city where the 
experiment took place.   
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ticket, he or she had to pay a fine of € 10 plus the price of the unpaid ticket (€ 11.70 in 
total); this was made common knowledge. At the end of each experimental day, 
subjects received an immediate feedback on whether they had been audited (or not) 
and fined. However, this information does not remain visible on the computer screen 
once the subject moves to the next day. This means that subjects have to memorize 
the previous sequence of audits. At the end of the task, three periods (days) were 
selected at random for actual payment.  
The experiment consisted of 8 treatments. These are summarized in Table 2. In 
all treatments, we employed the same number of audits (12 in total). In the 
Random-Random treatment (RR), 6 audits were randomly distributed over the first 
block (days 1 to 30), and other 6 over the second block (days 31 to 60). In the 
Crackdown-Crackdown treatment (CC), we concentrated 6 consecutive audits in each 
block. In particular, subjects were audited in days 3 to 8 and 33 to 38.11 To break the 
regularity of a crackdown’s occurrence, we ran the Crackdown-Random treatment 
(CR), which is similar to the CC treatment except that, in the second block, audits 
were spread out as in the RR treatment. In the Random-Crackdown treatment (RC), 
we reversed this order by having random audits in the first block and a crackdown in 
the second block.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
In order to measure the impact of a longer crackdown policy, in the 
Early-Long-Crackdown treatment (C_Long1) we concentrated 12 consecutive audits 
in the first block, from day 3 to 14, and we applied no audit in the second block. To 
measure whether the timing of a crackdown matters, we also ran the 
Late-Long-Crackdown (C_Long2), where we applied the 12 consecutive audits in the 
second block from day 33 to 45.  
As explained earlier, previous studies suggest that crackdowns should be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The reason why we started the crackdown in day 3 and day 33 is that we did not want subjects to 
easily learn the occurrence of an audit.  
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pre-announced (Eeckhout et al., 2010). This motivates our last two treatments: 
Random-Random with pre-announcement (RR_A) and Crackdown-Crackdown with 
pre-announcement (CC_A). The treatments RR_A and CC_A are similar to the RR 
and CC treatments. The only difference is that subjects were informed in advance 
each day (i.e. before making a decision) whether an audit would occur this day.  
In our setting, if subjects knew the exact audit probability – which is 20% given 
12 audits across 60 periods – buying a ticket would be a dominant strategy.12 
However, the audit probability is unknown. Rational and risk-neutral subjects should 
fraud if their perceived probability of audit is lower than 14.53%.  
3.2 Experimental procedures  
279 participants were recruited for a 45-minute experiment at the exit of the bus and 
tram in front of the main railway station of Lyon, the third largest city in France, 
between 11:00am and 6:30pm. Recruiters wore no uniform (to signal that they were 
not ticket inspectors). The recruiters invited passengers to participate in a study 
conducted by researchers of the university. People holding a monthly-pass were 
excluded (by definition, these persons are not fare-dodgers). 
  Recruiters informed passengers individually that the study would last between 
45 and 60 minutes, they would earn between € 25 and € 75, on average € 50, and they 
would be paid immediately at the end of the experiment in vouchers which could be 
exchanged for goods and services in several places, including a near commercial 
center. They also indicated that all decisions were strictly anonymous and that no 
special knowledge was required. Once passengers agreed to participate, recruiters 
informed them to keep their ticket (if they had one) because it will be exchanged for a 
new free ticket at the end of the experiment to compensate them for the time spent in 
the lab.13  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 If the audit probability was known, rational and risk-neutral agents should always choose to buy a 
ticket since the payoff would be higher than not to buy a ticket. 
13 After having been punched, a ticket was valid for one hour. Hence, it was entirely legitimate and 
credible to compensate a ticket-holding subject with a new ticket for the time spent in the lab. 
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  We also recruited 35 subjects from the Fine Collection Office (FCO). These 
people did not pay immediately their fine after having being caught travelling without 
a ticket and they were issued a fine ticket to be paid later at the FCO. After they made 
their payment, recruiters used a similar procedure to invite them to participate in our 
experiment.  
  The experiment was conducted using our mobile laboratory in a building 
located near the recruitment point. Mobile partitions were used to isolate participants. 
Subjects made their decisions via tactile tablets. A maximum of 9 subjects participated 
at the same time in the laboratory. Since there was no interaction between participants 
during the experiment, subjects could start the experiment as soon as they arrived in 
the room. 
Upon arrival and after signing a consent form, an experimenter randomly guided 
each participant to a workstation. Subjects were reminded that decisions were 
anonymous. All the instructions were displayed on the tablet. They were informed 
that they could raise their hand at any time and an experimenter would come to them 
and answer their questions privately. 
Once a subject completed all the tasks, he or she was escorted to a separate 
payment room where he or she was paid in vouchers. Then we exchanged his or her 
validated ticket – if he or she had one – with a free day pass (providing a real 
incentive for exchanging a validated ticket). 
Subjects on average completed the experiment in 37 minutes (12.81 of standard 
deviation) excluding the payment procedures. On average, participants earned about € 
60 (20.59 of standard deviation). Earnings were calculated based on subjects’ 
decisions in parts 1, 2 and either 3 or 4.  
3.3 Identification of fare-dodgers 
One major novelty of our study is the fact that we are able to measure the impact of 
different law-enforcement policies on actual fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers. 
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Therefore, it is important to describe how we identified fare-dodgers and 
non-fare-dodgers.  
  We collected three different measures of fare-dodgers. First, we categorized as 
fare-dodgers subjects who were recruited at the FCO. Second, fare-dodgers were 
those subjects who could not display a validated ticket at the end of the experiment. 
Finally, we classified as fare-dodgers those participants who, in the final questionnaire, 
self-reported to travel without a valid ticket at least once every 10 trips.14 Note that 
we define a subject as fare-dodger if he or she fits in one or more of the three 
categories above. We believe this is a relatively reliable and comprehensive way to 
identify fare-dodgers for the following reasons.15  First, we know for sure that 
subjects recruited at the FCO were fare-dodgers. Second, we can confidently say that 
subjects who could not display a valid ticket were fare dodgers since we recruited 
them when they were getting off the bus/tram and we explicitly told them to keep 
their ticket16. Hence, they were supposed to hold a validated ticket unless they fare 
dodged. Third, there is no reason why subjects who self-reported as fare-dodgers lied 
about this.17 Of course, we recognize that our classification has some limitations and 
may not capture all the fare-dodgers who participated in our experiment. Some of 
them may have in fact bought the ticket on the day of the experiment and lied about 
their illegal behavior. 18  We should however point out that, if we accidentally 
classified some subjects as non-fare-dodgers, this would only strengthen our results if 
we find differences in behavior between the two groups (fare-dodgers and 
non-fare-dodgers). 
To provide some summary statistics on our measures of fare-dodgers, excluding 
subjects from the FCO, 41.80% of the remaining participants could not show a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 In the questionnaire, they were asked to report how often (from 0 to 10) they travel without a valid 
ticket out of 10 trips. 
15 An alternative procedure would be that of relying only on one of the three measures. The risk is of 
course that of underestimate the number of fare dodgers. 
16 The lab was also near the tram and bus stop (about 100 meters from the stop). 
17 The opposite is likely to be true, that is subjects who self-reported as non-fare-dodgers were actually 
fare-dodgers. 
18 We believe these are more likely to be occasional fare dodgers. 
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validated ticket, 54.92% self-reported as fare-dodgers, 68.44% self-reported to be 
fare-dodgers and/or could not show a validated ticket, and 28.28% both self-reported 
as fare-dodgers and could not show a validated ticket.19 
4. Experimental results 
In this section, we first examine, both in aggregate and at individual level, the relative 
efficiency and effectiveness of our different treatments in terms of induced behavior, 
and whether fare-dodgers behave differently than non-fare-dodgers. We then compare 
the relative efficiency of the various crackdown policies in terms of revenue collected.  
4.1 Relative efficiency and effectiveness of different treatments 
Table 3 displays some summary statistics on the average fraud rate by treatment for 
actual fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers.  
[Table 3 about here] 
One first important observation is that actual-fare-dodgers fraud more than 
non-fare-dodgers in all treatments and this difference is significant except in the RR 
and C_Long1 treatments (see the Test column in Table 3). This finding is important as 
it suggests that our experiment has some external validity. 
  Table 3 also indicates that the average fraud rate differs across treatments. 
Straight comparisons of the fraud rates between treatments using non-parametric tests 
may, however, not be right. Since fare-dodgers behave differently than 
non-fare-dodgers, differences between treatments may in fact be explained by a 
different proportion of fare-dodgers rather than a change in behavior induced by the 
treatment manipulation.     
Although the recruitment process was random, we indeed detect some variations 
in the participation of actual-fare-dodgers in each treatment, which may bias our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 These figures are consistent with data from the local public transport company (see, e.g., Keolis, 
2014), and other studies conducted in comparable countries (Bucciol et al., 2013). Our high 
percentages are also due to the fact that we excluded people with a monthly pass from our experiment.    
 15 
measure of relative efficiency of crackdowns.20 In order to control for this potential 
bias, we estimate a random-effects probit model with robust standard errors clustered 
at the individual level to account for the fact that the 279 players made 60 successive 
decisions. The dependent variable is a dummy which is equal to 1 if a subject chose to 
fraud on a given experimental day. Independent variables include a dummy variable 
for each treatment with RR taken as the reference category. The “Intensity Crackdown” 
variable indicates the consecutive number of audits occurred before the current day 
and captures the impact of crackdowns. We also control for whether a subject had 
been fined in the previous experimental day. In addition, we include measures of risk 
aversion in the gain and the loss domain with or without uncertainty.21 Finally, we 
control for the behavior of fare-dodgers in two complementary ways. First, we 
include a dummy for fare-dodgers who did not display a valid ticket or self-reported 
as frauders. Second, we control, with a separate dummy, for the behavior of the 
fare-dodgers recruited at the FCO. We treat these latter fare-dodgers separately as 
their behavior is susceptible to be different from other fare-dodgers since they had just 
paid a fine.  
[Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4, Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the regression conducted on 
the data from the first block (days 1-30) and the second block (days 31-60) 
respectively, while Column (3) pools the data from the two blocks together. Columns 
(4-6) are identical to Columns (1-3) except that we only use data from actual 
fare-dodgers. In Columns (7-9), we only use data from non-fare-dodgers. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
To help discussing the main results of Table 4, we also plot the fraud rate over 
time for each of our different treatments (Figure 1). For the sake of readability, we 
pool some days together. Precisely, we divide each block into four parts: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The number of actual fare-dodgers varies between 61% (C_Long1) to 79% (RR). 
21 The higher the value, the less risk averse the subject is. 
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pre-crackdown days (1-3, 31-33), crackdown days (4-9, 34-39), post-crackdown days 
(10-12, 40-42), and the remaining days (13-30, 43-60).22  Crackdown days are 
identified with a vertical line. In each panel of Figure 1, we always display the 
baseline condition (i.e. the RR treatment).  
  Table 4 shows that the probability of fraud is 14.2% higher in the CC treatment 
compared to the RR treatment. This also appears in Figure 1 where the average fraud 
rate of the CC treatment is always greater or similar to the average fraud rate of the 
RR treatment except during the second crackdown. Figure 1 (Panel A) also shows that, 
in the CC treatment, subjects almost did not react to the first crackdown but only to 
the second one as if there was a learning effect at work. Alternating crackdowns with 
random controls does not make any difference compared to only random controls. As 
Table 4 (and also Figure 1) indicates, both CR and RC have no impact on the 
probability of fare dodging compared to RR. This leads to our first result. 
Result 1: Crackdowns fail reducing overall fare evasion. 
We next consider the impact of pre-announcing audits. Model (3) of Table 4 
reveals that participants are more likely to fraud in treatment CC_A and RR_A 
compared to the baseline (RR). The probability is 22.8% and 14.6% higher, 
respectively. This is also confirmed in Figure 1 (Panel B) where the average fraud rate 
is generally higher in RR_A compared to RR, and CC_A to CC. The reason, which is 
well captured by Figure 1, is that pre-announcement makes people fare dodging more 
when there is no audit. This leads to our second result: 
Result 2: Pre-announcement of audits decreases their overall effectiveness.  
We can investigate the effect of having longer crackdowns by looking at 
C_Long1 and C_Long2. The probability of committing a fraud is significantly higher !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 A crackdown ran from day 3 (33) until day 8 (38) but its effect operated from day 4 (34) until day 9 
(39). In other words, the effect of a crackdown was one-day delayed. This is because subjects were not 
informed in advance of a crackdown. There is however an exception: in the CC_A treatment, the 
control was pre-announced and, therefore, the effect and execution of a crackdown coincided. For this 
treatment, crackdown days are 3-8 and 33-38. This is taken into account in Figure 3.       
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in C_Long1 (17.1%) compared to RR while there is no significant difference between 
RR and C_Long2 (see Table 4). Figure 3 (Panel C) shows that fraud increases 
considerably after the introduction of an early longer crackdown (C_long1 treatment) 
and, to a lesser extent, before the introduction of a late longer crackdown (C_long2 
treatment). This leads to our third result:  
Result 3: Longer crackdowns are overall less effective if they occur in the early 
stage of the experiment. 
To measure, other things being equal, the short-run effect of a crackdown (i.e. the 
immediate effect of a crackdown once it is introduced), we can look at the variable 
“Intensity Crackdown”, that is the number of consecutive audits over time. We find 
that the probability to fraud, on average, drops by 5.8% in the immediate run for each 
consecutive day with an audit. This means that frequent consecutive audits discipline 
people in the short run. In Figure 2, we plot the marginal effect of each consecutive 
day of audit on the probability of not buying a ticket. We can see that the effect is not 
linear. The drop is sharp in the first days and it softens in the following. Fraud 
decreases by about 50% after 3/4 days, and it is almost eradicated after 9 days (only 1% 
or less of fraud). We can also look at the effect of being fined in the previous day. 
Surprisingly, it has no additional impact on fraud. A possible explanation is that some 
people cheat more to recover from the loss while others cheat less because of the 
educative effect of the fine. The net effect is neutral. 
The results of Table 4 also confirm our previous finding that actual fare-dodgers 
cheated more than actual non-fare-dodgers. In particular, self-reported fare-dodgers or 
non-ticket holders are much more likely to cheat than non-fare-dodgers (+39.7%). 
The same applies to fare-dodgers recruited at the FCO (+29.9%). We also find that all 
the previous results (i.e. treatment effects and short-term impact of crackdowns) are 
even stronger among actual fare-dodgers (Columns 4-6). In contrast, there are no 
treatment effects among non-fare-dodgers. This provides important support to the 
external validity of our experiment and leads to our fourth result: 
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Result 4: Actual fare-dodgers fraud more than non-fare-dodgers and are more 
sensitive to our treatment manipulations.   
On a final note, Table 4 shows that the risk attitude of subjects – in different 
domains (gains or losses) and information sets (uncertain or certain probabilities) – 
does not explain behavior in our daily public transportation game. This suggests that 
the decision to act dishonestly is, in our setting, better explained by other factors, such 
as emotional, moral or social concerns, than simple cost-benefit considerations. 
4.2 Relative efficiency in terms of payoffs 
  We now investigate the relative efficiency of the various audit policies from 
the point of view of the public transportation company by calculating the total 
revenue (paid tickets plus fines) that the company is able to collect. Figure 2 displays 
the total revenue for all our different treatments. Based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
we find no significant difference in revenue between treatments CR, RC, and RR (p > 
0.1 for all possible comparisons). The revenue is instead significantly lower in 
treatments CC, C_Long1, C_Long2, CC_A, RR_A compared to RR (p = 0.020 for CC, 
and p < 0.001 for the other comparisons). This is in line with some of our previous 
findings and leads to our last result:  
Result 5: Crackdowns do not increase the revenue of the law-enforcement 
institution.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
Our artefactual field experiment provides a comprehensive analysis of the relative 
efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdowns policies. The main finding is that 
crackdowns, alone, decrease overall effectiveness compared to random controls 
mostly because they induce a burst of fraud in the subsequent periods with no control. 
Only when they are alternated with random controls or protracted for a longer time at 
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the late stage of the game,23 they achieve a level of overall compliance similar to a 
randomly distributed control policy. We also find that pre-announcing a control 
decreases overall compliance although it increases the effectiveness of a crackdown 
during its launch. 
We believe all these results are very valuable for policy-makers who are 
contemplating which policy interventions to adopt against law-breaking behavior. In 
particular, our results suggest that under ambiguity in the domain of losses, systematic 
controls in a limited amount of time are, at best, as effective as random controls and 
potentially very inefficient in the long-run both in terms of achieved compliance and 
revenue for the law-enforcement institution.  
One however should be careful in generalizing our results to any environment 
where crackdown policies may be relevant. Our study focuses on a specific field of 
application (i.e. public transportations), and look at a specific type of law violation 
(e.g. fare-dodging). It may be that crackdowns are very effective and efficient in other 
domains of application. This should be investigated in future studies. 
Finally, although we try to be as comprehensive as possible by considering 
different and alternative policies of crackdown, there are still many grey areas which 
deserve future empirical investigation. For example, crackdowns may arise 
endogenously! (Dai, 2015a). Quoting Van de Weele (2012, p. 417), “enforcement 
strength is not exogenous, but determined by feedback effects between society and 
enforcers and social processes within the enforcement agencies themselves”. 
Crackdowns may also cause displacement effects, e.g. participants who are subjected 
to crackdowns will move to other areas during crackdown periods and thus decrease 
their efficiency. All these issues can be addressed in future studies.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 When the crackdown lasts longer and is localized towards the end of the game, subjects comply 
more during the period of no control as if they were expecting a control at any time. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Lotteries payoffs 
Note: The level of risk is represented by the standard deviation of the expected payoff. 
Table 2: Summary of the treatments 
Treatment Days 1-30 Days 31-60 
Random-Random (RR) Random audits Random audits 
Crackdown-Crackdown (CC) Crackdown (days 3-8) Crackdown days (33-38) 
Crackdown-Random (CR) Crackdown (days 3-8) 6 Random audits 
Random-Crackdown (RC) Random audits Crackdown (days 33-38) 
Early-Long-Crackdown (C_long1) Crackdown (days 3-14) No audit 
Late-Long-Crackdown (C_long2) No audit Crackdown (days 33-44) 
Crackdown-Crackdown with 
Pre-announcement (CC_A) 
Crackdown (days 3-8) Crackdown (days 33-38) 
Random-Random with 
Pre-announcement (RR_A) 
Random audits Random audits 
Note: The number of audits (12 in total) was constant across treatments. 
 
 
 
 
  Probability (%) Payoff Expected Payoff  
 Event Certain Uncertain 
Gain 
domain 
Loss 
domain 
Gain 
domain 
Loss 
domain 
Risk 
Lottery 1 
A 50 30-70 € 28 € −12 
€ 28 € −12 0 
B 50 30-70 € 28 € −12 
Lottery 2 
A 50 30-70 € 24 € −16 
€ 30 € −10 6 
B 50 30-70 € 36 € −4 
Lottery 3 
A 50 30-70 € 20 € −20 
€ 32 € −8 12 
B 50 30-70 € 44 € 4 
Lottery 4 
A 50 30-70 € 16 € −24 
€ 34 € −6 18 
B 50 30-70 € 52 € 12 
Lottery 5 
A 50 30-70 € 12 € −28 
€ 36 € −4 24 
B 50 30-70 € 60 € 20 
Lottery 6 
A 50 30-70 € 2 € −38 
€ 36 € −4 34 
B 50 30-70 € 70 € 30 
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Table 3: Summary statistics on the fraud rate 
 
All Fare-dodgers Non-fare-dodgers Test 
RR (n = 38) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
NS 
CC (n = 38) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
*** 
CR (n = 36) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
** 
RC (n = 38) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
*** 
C_Long1 (n = 31) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
NS 
C_Long2 (n = 36) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
*** 
CC_A (n = 31) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
** 
RR_A (n = 31) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
** 
Tot. (n = 279) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
*** 
Notes: The “Test” column informs whether the fraud rate is different between fare-dodgers and 
non-fare-dodgers, according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, NS p>0.1. 
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                                            Table 4: Random-effects probit model  
 
 All Observations Fare-dodgers only Non-Fare-dodgers only 
Dependent variable: Fraud (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1 if Fraud, 0 if not) 1st Month 2nd Month All 1st Month 2nd Month All 1st Month 2nd Month All 
          
RR Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
CC 0.113 0.175** 0.142* 0.183* 0.282*** 0.225** 0.006 0.007 0.014 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.046) (0.052) (0.038) 
CR -0.025 0.022 -0.013 -0.005 0.078 0.021 -0.016 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.082) (0.112) (0.115) (0.113) (0.044) (0.049) (0.034) 
RC 0.034 0.042 0.040 0.096 0.123 0.110 -0.026 -0.028 -0.018 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.054) (0.060) (0.041) 
C_Long1 0.118 0.218** 0.171** 0.117 0.283** 0.204* 0.042 0.048 0.040 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.117) (0.115) (0.115) (0.051) (0.062) (0.047) 
C_Long2 0.050 0.131 0.071 0.184* 0.261** 0.193* -0.053 -0.022 -0.026 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.082) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.056) (0.054) (0.040) 
CC_A 0.186** 0.283*** 0.228*** 0.270*** 0.410*** 0.333*** 0.046 0.050 0.039 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.104) (0.101) (0.102) (0.065) (0.073) (0.054) 
RR_A 0.103 0.182** 0.146* 0.178 0.303*** 0.239** 0.013 0.019 0.022 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.046) (0.052) (0.040) 
Intensity crackdown -0.039*** -0.076*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.095*** -0.077*** -0.007** -0.025* -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) 
Fined in the previous period 0.025 0.009 0.023 0.044 0.008 0.037* -0.008 0.011 -0.003 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.029) (0.032) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) 
           
 25 
                                                             
Notes: The table reports marginal effects. These are calculated assuming that the random effects are zero. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01.                                                
Continued                                All Observations Fare-dodgers only Non-Fare-dodgers only 
Dependent variable: Fraud (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) (9) 
(1 if Fraud, 0 if not) 1st Month 2nd Month All 1st Month 2nd Month All 1st Month 2nd Month All 
Risk index in the gain domain -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Risk index in the loss domain 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.016 0.021 -0.000 0.005 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Risk index in the gain domain 
under uncertainty 
-0.014 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Risk index in the loss domain 
under uncertainty 
-0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 0.003 -0.000 0.002 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Fare-dodgers (Self-report  
Or no ticket) 
0.388*** 0.383*** 0.397*** - - - - -  
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051)       
Fare-dodgers (fine recovery 
office) 
0.298*** 0.282*** 0.299*** - - - - -  
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075)       
Day 0.003*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 8,091 8,370 16,461 5,858 6,060 11,918 2,233 2,310 4,543 
Wald-chi2 260.25 461.18 718.94 153.74 379.16 570.63 65.44 37.17 99.19 
Prob >chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Log likelihood -3579.906 -3396.3567 -6825.861 -3000.962 -2818.507 -5707.403 -586.3902 -570.4097 -1109.6325 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the average fraud rate by blocks of days over the sixty days  
 
 
Notes: The vertical bars identify crackdown days. In treatment CC_A, the effect and execution of a crackdown coincided. In Panel B, crackdown days are 3-8 and 33-38 for this 
treatment.
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Figure 2: Predictive margins of the fraud probability over consecutive days with audit 
 
Note: the band identifies the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 3: Total revenue per ticket by treatment 
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Appendix 
                       Figure A1: Lab in the field 
 
 
 
                       Figure A2: Decision-making screen shot 
 
 
